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This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the feasibility of the provision of micro flood 
insurance as an effective tool for spreading disaster risks in developing countries and examines the 
role of the institutional–organisational framework in assisting the design and implementation of 
such a micro flood insurance market. In Bangladesh, a private insurance market for property 
damage and livelihood risk due to natural disasters does not exist. Private insurance companies 
are reluctant to embark on an evidently unprofitable venture. Testing two different institutional–
organisational models, this research reveals that the administration costs of micro-insurance play 
an important part in determining the long-term viability of micro flood insurance schemes. A 
government-facilitated process to overcome the differences observed in this study between the non-
profit micro-credit providers and profit-oriented private insurance companies is needed, building 
on the particular competence each party brings to the development of a viable micro flood insurance 
market through a public–private partnership. 
Keywords: Bangladesh, flood insurance, institutional design, natural disasters, 
viability 
Introduction
Insurance has been referred to as an effective tool for reducing, sharing and spreading 
climate change-induced disaster risks in both developed and developing countries 
(Bouwer and Vellinga, 2002; Hoff et al., 2003; Mills, 2004; Botzen and van den 
Bergh, 2008; Brouwer and Akter, 2010). The institutional structure of insurance has 
come to occupy centre stage in the debate about financing disaster risks with pro-
ponents of public and private financial risk management systems on either side. 
 Dworkin (2000) emphasises the important role of state management of risks through 
the provision of insurance, offering a model of egalitarian justice within the social 
welfare realm of the economy. In contrast, Shiller (2003) argues for private income 
insurance in an economy without government intervention. He envisions the emer-
gence of a private insurance market, which would offer livelihood insurance, home 
equity insurance and income-linked loans to share the society-wide risks. The pri-
mary driving force behind Shiller’s (2003) thesis is the potential financial gain from 
increased risk sharing within the society that could accrue to private insurance com-
panies and financial institutions. 
 Both theories of a public and private risk management system have been criticised 
by political philosophers and financial economists. Farrelly (2007) claims that Dworkin’s 
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(2000) theory of a ‘hypothetical insurance market’ is an ineffective theory of social 
justice because it is unable to address practical trade-offs that arise in non-ideal 
societies facing resource scarcity. Shiller’s (2003) concept of livelihood risk sharing has 
been rejected on the grounds of lack of commercial viability and effective demand. 
Dowd (2003) argues that the implementation of livelihood insurance or income-
linked loans is constrained by a wide variety of different institutional risks associated 
with private supply provision, including credit or default risks and legal risks. Similarly, 
Rose (2004) rejects the concept of livelihood insurance or home equity insurance, 
referring to the fact that existing markets do not provide such risk-sharing contracts 
for a reason: markets for such contracts are incomplete, impractical and unfeasible. 
 Against this background, this paper aims to contribute to the international aca-
demic discussion on appropriate institutional–economic structures of risk management. 
It assesses the financial viability and institutional preconditions that need to be in place 
for successful provision of a micro-insurance scheme. Shiller’s (2003) proposal to 
create a private insurance market serves as a model to test the financial viability of 
a flood insurance scheme in Bangladesh where a large proportion of the population 
confronts livelihood and house property damage risks due to catastrophic events. A 
mixed quantitative–qualitative research approach was followed. In a large-scale rural 
household survey carried out between August and October 2006, 2,400 floodplain 
residents were asked about their demand for different forms of insurance schemes: 
crop damage, house property and unemployment insurance schemes. Households’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) was estimated and compared with expected indemnity 
payouts by insurance providers, within the framework of two different organisa-
tional models of micro-insurance supply: a ‘partner–agent’ model (PA) and a ‘full–
service’ (FS) model—which are explained in the following sections. The qualitative 
assessment is based on semi-structured interviews and a workshop with decision-
makers in private insurance companies, micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to investigate the viability of private insurance 
provision in Bangladesh. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the second section presents a 
discussion of catastrophe risk insurance in a developing country context. The case 
study is presented in the third section, followed by floodplain residents’ character-
istics and attitudes towards buying micro flood insurance and their willingness to pay 
insurance premiums in the fourth and fifth sections, respectively. The commercial 
viability of micro flood insurance schemes is addressed in the sixth section. The re-
sults of the in-depth interviews and the workshop are presented in the seventh section. 
Finally, the eighth section contains some conclusions and policy recommendations.
Insurance against catastrophe risk in a developing 
country context
With regard to long-term sustainability of micro-insurance in effectively transfer-
ring and hedging natural disaster risk, the existing literature considers four key 
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criteria: contribution to risk reduction; commercial viability; affordability; and gov-
ernance (ProVention Consortium/IIASA, 2005). Commercial viability and afford-
ability often are considered the most challenging criteria to be fulfilled in developing 
economies given the nature of the environmental and financial risks to the insurer 
and the financial constraints on the insured. 
 Natural disasters result in systematic losses correlated across clients and geograph-
ical regions. Therefore, insurers face the risk of having to compensate large losses due 
to a disaster event that affects clients in an entire community or region. As a result, 
the standard principle of paying damage compensation to affected clients only by 
pooling resources from non-affected clients typically does not apply (Duncan and 
Myers, 2000). Furthermore, the scope of reinsuring disaster insurance schemes is 
limited or the costs of reinsurance are very high (ProVention Consortium/IIASA, 
2005). Due to these obstacles, private insurers have been reluctant to offer policies 
that cover flood and other natural hazards.
 From the perspective of the insured, insurance demand in low-income economies 
frequently is low due to limited financial resources and thus has been found insuf-
ficient to ensure risk pooling even within the community or region. Households 
exposed to the risk of natural catastrophes in developing countries usually are part 
of the poorer segments of society (IPCC, 2007). Previous work in one of the most 
flood-prone areas of Bangladesh shows that poor households are more exposed to 
the risk of flooding than wealthier households, which are able to cope better with 
preventing damage costs (Brouwer et al., 2007). This study also revealed that poorer 
households suffer relatively higher damage costs because of flooding. Another study 
conducted in the same floodplain area revealed that 60 per cent of its residents are will-
ing but unable to contribute financially to the construction of a protective embank-
ment in the region because of insufficient financial means (Brouwer et al., 2009). These 
findings imply that, even if an insurance provider exists, poor households in Bangladesh 
probably cannot afford commercial insurance due to income constraints. 
 Nevertheless, disaster risk insurance programmes have been introduced in many 
developing countries (Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer and Peppiatt, 2006). Although ex-
periences and available information are too limited to draw general conclusions about 
such schemes, disaster risk insurance has not been very successful overall from a 
commercial standpoint. Nearly 30 years ago a multi-peril crop insurance programme 
was introduced by the Government of Bangladesh, covering the crop damage risks 
of more than 15,000 farmers (Miah, 1992). The initiative was commercially unsuc-
cessful as claims consistently exceeded premium revenues. In 10 of its 17 years of 
operation, the loss ratio was more than 400 per cent (Rahman, 2007). The government-
operated National Agriculture Insurance Scheme (NAIS) in India also operates at a 
substantial loss. During its five years of operation, premium revenues have covered 
only one-third of indemnity claims (Raju and Chand, 2008). Taking into account 
the administration costs, the premiums only covered 12 per cent of programme costs 
in the southern Indian state of Karnataka (Kalavakonda and Mahul, 2005). 
 In some instances, providers offer micro-insurance products together with other 
financial services. For example, micro-credit providers offer insurance products jointly 
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with micro-credit loans or savings schemes. Proshika, one of the largest micro-
credit providers in Bangladesh, has offered compulsory group-based insurance since 
1997. Under this programme, clients are required to deposit two per cent of their 
savings in an insurance fund. In the event of any loss incurred by the clients due to 
natural disasters, twice the amount of the accumulated savings in the insurance fund 
is returned to them. Bundled disaster insurance schemes have three key advantages. 
First, the system enables the insurer to diversify risks by adding other risks to the 
portfolio that are uncorrelated across clients. Second, adverse selection is reduced 
if clients are obliged to purchase the insurance, including those facing low flood risk. 
Third, if the insurance is offered jointly with other products, transaction costs are 
lower than if they were sold separately. 
 Despite these advantages from the provider’s viewpoint, there is a real risk that 
bundled insurance affects the affordability of micro-insurance provision as it adds to 
the clients’ purchasing costs. Compulsory insurance schemes that are bundled with 
micro-credit or savings schemes may become a barrier to low-income households 
to access credit facilities as such schemes increase the costs of borrowing or reduce the 
returns from savings. Therefore, insurance holders usually are averse to compulsory 
insurance programmes, as is evidenced for example in the case of the Self-Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) in India discussed in a review of existing micro-
insurance programmes in developing countries (Mechler et al., 2006). The SEWA 
initially offered a mandatory life insurance policy together with micro-credit, but 
the scheme was changed to voluntary provision after complaints from clients.
Case study
In the context of both low demand and supply of natural disaster insurance schemes, 
a model was constructed to test the commercial viability of such an insurance 
scheme in Bangladesh. Weather-related risk is a major cause of rural income fluc-
tuations in Bangladesh. Impact assessments carried out by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) identify Bangladesh as one of the world’s worst victim 
countries in terms of the negative impacts of climate change. Those expected to be 
hardest hit by natural disasters are the poorer segments of society, which lack ade-
quate means to take protective action and have little capacity to cope with the loss of 
property and income (IPCC, 2007). 
 Traditionally, the management of flood disaster risks in Bangladesh has focused on 
infrastructural engineering measures, such as embankments, and ex-post flood relief 
measures, such as post-disaster credit facilities. In recent years, the concept of ‘pro-
active adaptation’ has attracted more attention among poverty alleviation programmes 
in Bangladesh to deal with natural disaster risks. While the use of micro-insurance 
to cover life and health risks is prevalent to some extent, its use to hedge against 
natural disaster losses in rural areas is still in its infancy. The National Adaptation 
Programme of Action, prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (2005) 
of Bangladesh, suggests exploring options for spreading natural disaster risks by inves-
tigating the potential of a flood insurance market. 
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Figure 1 Geographical location of the case study area
Source: Geographic Information System cell, Department of Local Government Engineering, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
 To explore the demand for flood insurance, a household survey was conducted. 
Five districts located along the three major rivers in Bangladesh ( Jamuna, Meghna 
and Padma) were selected on the basis of damage intensity levels observed during the 
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2004 disaster flood (Figure 1). The selection of households in each of the villages 
followed a systematic random sampling method. The questionnaire was based on 
focus-group discussions and pre-tests with approximately 40 individual household 
heads in different parts of the study area. In total, 2,400 household heads were inter-
viewed during the main survey from the third week of August until the first week 
of October 2006 by 15 trained and experienced interviewers. The survey question-
naire consisted of about 50 questions and was divided into three sections: 1) socio-
demographic household characteristics (gender, age, occupation, education, family 
size, sources of income, assets, and standard of living); 2) the type and extent of 
suffering due to annual and incidental disaster flooding (flood frequency, flood dura-
tion, inundation level, type and extent of flood damage and level of preparedness); 
and 3) attitudes to and willingness to pay for micro flood insurance. In this third 
and final part of the questionnaire, respondents were presented with a hypothetical 
insurance programme. 
 A series of focus-group discussions was conducted to determine the features of the 
hypothetical insurance product. During the sessions, the authors recognised respond-
ents’ vast unfamiliarity with a standard insurance contract. Participants struggled 
to comprehend any complex issues associated with insurance schemes, including 
partial insurance coverage and bundled insurance contracts. As a result, offering a 
standalone insurance scheme, involving full coverage of the damage bill, appeared 
to be the only plausible way forward. During the household survey, the hypothetical 
‘flood insurance product’ was offered to the respondents in the following form: 
I would now like to ask you a number of questions related to the potential of introducing a 
flood insurance scheme in this area. The principle of the proposed insurance scheme is as 
follows: you pay a fixed amount of money for the next five years—an insurance premium—
every week, two weeks or month depending on your preferred payment frequency. Only in 
the case of an officially acknowledged disaster flood, like the one in 2004, will you receive 
compensation for any losses suffered. If there is a disaster flood and you claim compensa-
tion, an independent survey or will visit you and assess the extent of the damage you 
suffered. Based on the surveyor’s independent assessment you will be compensated. The 
terms and conditions of your insurance scheme are protected by law.
 After a detailed description of the insurance scheme, respondents were asked three 
questions. First, whether or not they would be willing to participate in principle in an 
insurance scheme to reduce the risk of various forms of flood damage. Respondents 
who replied positively to the first question then were asked how frequently they 
would want to pay for their most preferred insurance scheme and who they would 
prefer to have as a provider. Hence, they were able to choose their preferred pay-
ment frequency, insurance provider and insurance product(s). Subsequently, a total 
of six different starting bids representing insurance premiums, ranging between 
USD 0.07 (Taka 5) and USD 0.71 (Taka 50), were used for the third valuation question. 
The bid levels were assigned randomly across respondents to avoid starting-point bias 
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(Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The weekly premiums were based on a previous large-
scale survey to test household’s willingness to pay for a flood protection embankment 
in one of the study areas and thorough pre-testing in the pre-tests. 
Respondent characteristics and attitudes to micro 
flood insurance
Table 1 compares the general demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
sample with the national population statistics. The average age of the respondents was 
44 years, whereas the national average was slightly lower (42 years). Approximately 
one-half (50.7 per cent) of the respondents were unable to read and write. Slightly 
more than one-quarter (26.8 per cent) finished primary school and only 14.0 per cent 
finished high school. Around one-third (35.0 per cent) of the sample households were 
involved full-time in agricultural activities to support their livelihood. In addition, 
16.4 per cent of the sample population consisted of agricultural day labourers. Trade 
(15.0 per cent), transport (ferry/taxi worker) (5.5 per cent), service (administrator) 
(6.5 per cent), construction (3.2 per cent) and fishery (2.1 per cent) were other sources 
of livelihood in the study areas. Average annual household income (related to the 
past 12 months) was around USD 1,291, while one-half of the sample population 
earned USD 846 per year. Dividing the median annual income by average household 
size and 12 months reveals that per capita income equals USD 14 per month, which is 
exactly the same as the national average rural per capita income (Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics, 2005). 
 Approximately one-half of the sample households interviewed in this study agreed 
in principle to participate in the proposed disaster insurance programme (n = 1,160). 
The two main reasons why respondents refused to participate in the insurance 
scheme were ‘limited financial income’ (45 per cent) and ‘dislike of the terms and 
conditions of the proposed flood insurance scheme’ (32 per cent). Around seven per 
cent (n = 81) of the respondents said that they were unable to assess the usefulness of 
the proposed hypothetical insurance scheme while another five per cent did not 
believe that they would be compensated by the insurer. 
 Less than two per cent of the sample respondents had ever bought an insurance 
policy and more than two-thirds were unfamiliar with how an insurance contract 
works. This finding is consistent with existing empirical evidence presented in other 
studies (Gine, Townsend and Vickery, 2008; Mechler et al., 2006), which document 
cases where insurance clients in developing countries were found to be widely igno-
rant of the technical aspects of an insurance contract. The current study furthermore 
detects a significant positive relationship (Chi square = 23.28, p<0.001) between 
respondents’ level of insurance familiarity and their decision to participate in the 
insurance scheme (see Table 2). Respondents who were more familiar with how an 
insurance scheme helps in pooling risk among communities were more willing to par-
ticipate than those who were less familiar. There is a significant positive correlation 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of respondent (household) demographic and socio-
economic characteristics
Respondent (household) characteristic Sample National average 
(for rural areas)
Male-headed household (%) 99 90
Respondent average age (median value) 44 (42) 42
Literacy rate respondent (%) Illiterate 50.7 61.0
Primary school 26.8
High school 14.0
Respondent occupation (%)
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 53.5 57.6 
Self-employed  
farmer
35.0
Self-employed 
fisherman
2.1
Day labourer 16.4
Non-agricultural 30.2 41.3 
Trade 15.0 16.6
Ferry/taxi worker 5.5 8.5
Service 6.5 5.9
Construction worker 3.2 3.2
Households with sanitary latrine facility (%) 25.3 20.6
Households with electricity connection (%) 45 31.2
Tube-well as main drinking water source (%) 98.8 95.8
Main sources of household energy (%) Twigs/leaves/ 
straw/dung
82.8 N/A
Average number of family members  
(min–max)
5.6 (1–26) 5.2
Average household income (USD/year) 
(standard deviation)
1,291 (1424) 1,044
Median household income (USD/year) 846 –
Average per capita income (USD/month) 
(standard deviation)
14 (20.3) 14
Median per capita income (USD/month) 12.4 –
Households owning agricultural land (%) 58.4 65.6a
Note:
a. National statistics considers farmers owning less than 0.5 hectare firm land as ‘landless’.
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2005). 
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Table 2 Cross-tabulation results between insurance familiarity and the decision to 
participate in an insurance scheme
Willing to buy insurance (%)
No Yes
Familiarity with insurance Not familiar at all 78 22
Not familiar 70 30
Somewhat familiar 40 60
Familiar 30 70
Completely familiar 25 75
between education and insurance familiarity (r = 0.216; p<0.001), which indicates that 
respondents with a higher level of education are more familiar with insurance.
 The group of respondents refusing to participate in the insurance scheme due to 
income constraints earned USD 822 per year whereas the average annual income of 
the group of respondents who refused to take part for other reasons was USD 1,601. 
The difference in mean yearly income between the two groups of respondents is sta-
tistically significant (Mann–Whitney Z = –10.20; p<0.001). The most unpopular 
feature of the proposed insurance scheme is that the insured will not receive a mon-
etary return in the event of no disaster occurring. This was mentioned by 65 per cent 
of respondents, who specified ‘dislike of terms and conditions’ as their main reason 
for non-participation. The group of respondents that refused to participate due to 
income constraints was also less familiar with the concept of insurance than others 
(Chi square = 81, p<0.001), whereas respondents who did not want to participate 
in the insurance programme because they disliked the terms and conditions were 
more familiar with insurance than other respondents (Chi square = 11, p<0.001). 
No significant difference was observed between insurance familiarity and respond-
ents’ lack of ability to assess the usefulness of insurance and respondents’ mistrust of 
insurance providers. 
 Respondents who agreed in principle to buy micro flood insurance were given the 
opportunity to choose from different types of products. One-half of the respondents 
wanted to insure their crop yield against flood risks while slightly more than one-
quarter wanted to buy insurance for house property damage, followed by another 
20 per cent who preferred unemployment insurance. Around two-thirds of the 
respondents who wanted to participate in the flood insurance programme preferred 
central government as the provider of the scheme. More than 80 per cent of the sample 
believed that the central government is responsible for the management of flood risks. 
Public willingness to pay for micro flood insurance
A double-bounded dichotomous choice format was used to elicit respondents’ will-
ingness to pay for flood insurance. Respondents were asked two questions: do you 
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Table 3 Mean WTP of the sample population for three insurance schemes2
 Insurance scheme
House property Crop Unemployment
Mean WTP (USD/week) 0.46 0.60 0.43
95% confidence interval (CI) 0.43–0.47 0.57–0.62 0.41–0.46
accept a start bid of c
i
?; and do you accept a follow-up bid of b
i
? Based on their 
answers, four possible intervals for WTP were constructed: 
•	 WTP	= 1: rejecting both the start bid (ci) and the follow-up bid (bi); 
•	 WTP	= 2: rejecting the start bid (ci) but accepting the follow-up bid (bi); 
•	 WTP	= 3: accepting the start bid (ci) but rejecting the follow-up bid (di);
•	 WTP	= 4: accepting both the start bid (ci) and the follow-up bid (di).
 Using the statistical assumptions underlying interval regression (Hanemann, Loomis 
and Kanninen, 1991; Alberini, 1995), three interval regression models were estimated 
for the three most preferred insurance schemes. Mean WTP values were derived from 
a simple model where the intervals are regressed on the starting bid (Hanemann and 
Kanninen, 1999), following the conventional procedure for binary WTP response 
data (Hanemann, 1984). The results are presented in Table 3. Floodplain residents’ 
WTP is highest for crop insurance, followed by property insurance and then unem-
ployment insurance. Mean WTP for crop insurance is USD 0.60 per household per 
week, USD 0.45 per week for house insurance and USD 0.43 per week for unem-
ployment insurance. Although the difference between mean WTP for property and 
unemployment insurance is small, it is statistically significant. 
 The estimated mean WTP amounts were treated as the expected premium to be 
received by the insurer. Given that the insurer receives a premium flow until the 
disaster event strikes at some point in the future, future values of the expected 
premium income needed to be calculated in order to make a comparison with one-off 
damage compensation payable to the insured. The future values of the average pre-
mium were calculated using the following formula for a future value of an annuity:
 Pi = WTPi * (1 + r)
n - 1 (1)
                              r
 Where: 
 P
i = future value of the revenues from insurance premiums (per insurance contract);
 r = nominal interest rate;
 n = number of years;
 WTP
i = average willingness to pay per insurance scheme per year; and
 i refers to a specific insurance scheme.
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 Three different flood probabilities were used to measure the number of years (n): 
high; medium; and low. These flood probabilities refer to floods occurring once 
every five years (high), eight years (medium) and 10 years (low), respectively. Two 
different market interest rates were employed to represent market conditions in 
Bangladesh: five per cent and 10 per cent. Table 4 presents the estimated future 
values of expected insurance premium revenues. These future values vary positively 
with estimated WTP and the interest rate and negatively with flood probabilities. 
A higher value of estimated average WTP and a higher market interest rate result 
in a higher future value of the expected insurance premium, ceteris paribus. However, 
a higher flood probability generates a lower value of ‘n’ in Equation 1 and therefore 
the future value of the expected insurance premium decreases. Consequently, ex-
pected future values of the insurance premium are high when a low flood probability 
is assumed and low when a high flood probability is assumed.
Commercial viability of micro flood insurance 
The condition for a financially viable insurance contract can be written in the fol-
lowing form (Hazell, 1992):
 A + I 
< 1
 (2)
       P 
 Where: 
 A = average administration costs per insurance contract;
 I = average indemnities paid; and
 P = average premiums paid.
 According to Equation 2, the premium collected on an insurance scheme must 
exceed the expected value of the average payout (indemnity) in order to ensure the 
viability of the insurance contract and the administration costs per insurance con-
tract. The term ‘indemnity’ refers to the amount of financial transfer payable by 
the insurer to the insured. A proxy for expected indemnity payments for different 
Table 4 Future value of expected insurance premium for different insurance schemes 
(in USD)
Flood probability High Medium Low
Interest rate 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10%
Insurance 
product
Crop 173.3 191.5 299.5 358.7 394.5 499.9
House property 132.3 146.1 228.6 273.7 301.1 381.5
Unemployment 127.7 141.1 220.7 264.3 290.7 368.3
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insurance schemes was established using average damage costs incurred by house-
holds in the disaster flood year of 2004. Administration costs are the costs to the 
insurer of managing and operating the insurance business, and include salaries, legal 
fees, utilities, and depreciation of office space, equipment and supplies. Administra-
tion costs also commonly include the cost of reinsurance premiums to the insurer. 
These costs vary depending on the type of risk, the kind of provider and the size 
of their client base. Table 5 presents an overview of the range of administration 
costs incurred by some mainstream insurance providers as well as by MFIs/NGOs. 
The costs vary from USD 6–22 per client per year.  The financial viability of a new 
micro flood insurance contract was tested using the highest (USD 22) and the lowest 
(USD 6) administration cost per contract. 
 Two different micro-insurance organisational models were applied: a ‘partner–
agent’ (PA) model and a ‘full–service’(FS) model (Cohen and McCord, 2003). The 
basic difference between them arises from the organisational structure, which pro-
duces a substantial difference in the implementation and administration costs. In a 
FS model, insurers provide all kinds of services, such as risk bearing, design of the 
insurance product, distribution, premium collection, damage assessment and compen-
sation disbursement. In a PA model, insurance companies and micro-credit providers 
collaborate to offer the insurance schemes jointly. Generally, insurance companies 
bear the full risk, while micro-credit providers carry out most of the field-level 
operational and administration work through their established client network. The 
administration cost of offering, distributing and maintaining insurance contracts under 
such a scheme is expected to be reduced to a negligible amount per insurance contract. 
A case study of micro-insurance and micro-finance institutions in India documents 
an administration cost of USD 1.8 per insurance contract per year under the PA 
model (Roth et al., 2005). In some cases, the administration cost has been found to 
be as low as USD 0.5 (ILO, 2006). An administration cost of USD 2 per insurance 
Table 5 Comparison of administration costs for different insurance providers (in USD)
Delta Life 
Insurance 
Company1
Microinsurance 
Mutual Entity 
(MIME) Pilot 
Project2
Sadharan Bima 
Corporation3
Green Delta 
Insurance 
Company Limited4
A private life 
insurance company 
offering micro life 
insurance
A collective of MFIs/
NGOs offering life 
insurance
The Bangladesh 
public general 
insurer
An example of a 
private general 
insurer
Administration costs 
per client per year
6a 16a 14 22
Notes:
1 Source: McCord and Churchill (2005).
2 Source: INAFI Bangladesh (2007).
3 Source: Sadharan Bima Corporation (2005)
4 Source: Green Delta Insurance Company Limited (2005)
a These
 
costs do not include the cost of reinsurance. 
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Table 6 Financial viability of three micro-flood insurance contracts under PA model
High Medium Low
Interest rate 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10%
(A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P
Insurance 
product
Crop 2.24 2.03 1.32 1.12 1.02 0.82
House property 0.97 0.88 0.60 0.51 0.47 0.39
Unemployment 0.77 0.71 0.48 0.42 0.39 0.32
Note: A= USD 2
Table 7 Financial viability of three micro-flood insurance contracts under FS model
Flood probability High
Interest rate 5% 10%
Administration cost (USD/year) 6 22 6 22
 (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P
Insurance
 product
 
Crop 2.37 2.88 2.16 2.67
House property 1.14 1.80 1.05 1.72
Unemployment 0.95 1.64 0.88 1.57
Flood probability Medium
Interest rate 5% 10%
Administration cost (USD/year) 6 22 6 22
 (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P
Insurance
 product
 
Crop 1.26 1.96 1.24 1.75
House property 0.81 1.43 0.68 1.35
Unemployment 0.71 1.35 0.59 1.28
Flood probability Low
Interest rate 5% 10%
Administration cost (USD/year) 6 22 6 22
 (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P (A+I)/P
Insurance
 product
 
Crop 1.15 1.66 0.95 1.46
House property 0.64 1.31 0.56 1.23
Unemployment 0.56 1.25 0.50 1.19
contract is assumed here in order to test the commercial viability of micro-insurance 
supply under the PA model. 
 Table 6 presents the commercial viability test results of different insurance schemes 
under a PA model assuming an administration cost of USD 2. The indemnity–premium 
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ratio [(A+I)/P] for crop insurance is below one in a PA model when flood probabil-
ities are low and the market interest rate is high (10 per cent). For all other combi-
nations of flood probabilities and interest rates, the indemnity–premium [(A+I)/P] 
ratio for crop insurance exceeds one, implying that the expected average premium 
that households are willing to pay is too low to cover the expected indemnity and 
administration costs. However, the [(A+I)/P] ratios for the two other insurance 
schemes, property and unemployment, are less than one for all combinations of flood 
probability and interest rate. This suggests that in a PA model, property and unemploy-
ment insurance are financially viable since the expected revenues exceed the expected 
indemnity and administration costs. 
 Changing the organisational design from a PA to a FS model results, as expected, 
in a substantially different outcome in terms of commercial viability of flood insur-
ance contracts. Table 7 presents the ratio of expected average payouts to expected 
premium revenues [(A+I)/P] for different insurance contracts assuming a FS model. 
For crop insurance, the [(A+I)/P] ratio exceeds one for almost all combinations of 
flood probability, interest rate and administration cost (except in one case where 
both the flood probability and administration cost are low and the market interest 
rate is high). If the insurance provider incurs a low supply cost per insurance con-
tract per year, property and unemployment insurance schemes are financially viable 
in a medium flood probability scenario. In the event of a high administration cost 
of 22 USD per year per insurance contract, the financial viability prospects of these 
two insurance schemes become gloomy. Both are financially viable only in a low-to-
medium flood probability scenario and when the administration cost is low. 
Potential insurance providers’ attitudes towards micro 
flood insurance
Following the household survey in 2006, in-depth key informant interviews and a 
workshop were conducted in 2007 with 20 representatives of the government, pri-
vate insurance companies, and micro-credit providers. The objective was to gain more 
insight into the opportunities for and threats to micro flood insurance provision in 
Bangladesh. The key informants selected for the survey were all high-profile decision-
makers. Before the interviews, they were informed about the research aims and the 
questions. A limited number of preliminary questions were asked to ensure that the 
key informants came prepared. Each interview lasted at least one hour and was based 
on a semi-structured questionnaire format.
 Besides discussing necessary conditions and criteria related to the potential for set-
ting up a micro flood insurance market in Bangladesh, financial, economic, social 
and legal motivations and the driving forces of organisational actors in this sector 
were addressed. Specifically, questions dealt with: governance and regulatory barriers 
to implementation of a micro flood insurance product; perceptions of the com-
mercial viability of a micro flood insurance product; and views on who should be 
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the provider of such a product and prospects for collaboration between private insur-
ance companies and MFIs/NGOs. The key findings are summarised below.
Institutional context
It was discovered through the interviews that MFIs/NGOs and mainstream insurance 
providers are governed by different agencies. For MFIs/NGOs, the main govern-
ing body is the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), under the Ministry of 
Finance. With respect to issuing insurance policies, the governing MRA Act (2006) 
stipulates that micro-credit institutions have the authority and responsibility to offer 
different types of insurance services to loan recipients and members of their families. 
Yet considerable uncertainty remains regarding the implications of the MRA Act 
for the provision of micro-insurance and—at the time of this study—no specific 
micro-insurance rules and laws have been established for MFIs/NGOs. 
 Unlike MFIs/NGOs, mainstream insurance providers operate under the Ministry 
of Commerce and the Bangladesh Insurance Act (1938), which regulates the insurer’s 
business. The Central Rating Commission, established under this Act, performs the 
actuarial function for the industry, fixing premium levels for each type of insurance 
product offered. 
Perceptions of commercial viability
Table 8 summarises key informants’ perceptions of the commercial viability of micro 
flood risk insurance. Most interviewees either did not believe that micro flood 
insurance would be profitable or were unsure about its commercial prospects. An 
executive of a private insurance company said that although he did not expect full 
cost-recovery, the social objectives of such plans are more important than profits. 
Surprisingly, representatives of both mainstream insurance companies and micro-
finance organisations stated that they would be interested in and willing to implement 
Table 8 Responses to some of the commercial viability questions
Mainstream insurance company 
representatives
Micro-finance organisation 
representatives
Do you think there is potential for flood insurance for poor farmers to be profitable?
Yes 50% 14%
No 50% 29%
Unsure 0% 57%
Would your organisation be willing to implement a crop insurance scheme even though there is a possibility it might not be 
financially viable in the short term?
Yes 100% 83%
No 0% 17%
Unsure 0% 0%
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a crop insurance scheme even if there was a possibility that it might not be financially 
viable in the short term.
 Organisations demonstrated different motivations depending on the nature of their 
operations. Micro-credit providers pointed to social concerns as their prime moti-
vation in considering micro-flood insurance. Several micro-credit providers said 
that they had been thinking about providing micro-insurance for crops in order to 
fulfil their social objectives regarding the agricultural and rural development of the 
country, even though the affordable premium rate for such insurance is too low to 
ensure financial viability. In contrast, the mainstream private insurance companies 
pointed to a classic motivation of profit maximisation, which does not come as a 
surprise considering that such companies are owned by shareholders who scrutinise 
financial performance as it relates to share price. Although the target clients of insur-
ance providers include both rural and urban poor, mainstream insurance companies 
give priority to clients with regular income flows, thus precluding individuals with 
irregular or seasonal income (see also Hasan, 2007). 
Prospects for collaboration
The in-depth interviews revealed that the majority of the key informants from both 
mainstream insurance companies and micro-finance organisations agreed that neither 
entity should offer micro-insurance on their own (Table 9). When asked in the inter-
views about the prospect of collaboration, mainstream insurance company represent-
atives were positive, affirming that they would consider delivering flood insurance 
in partnership with micro-finance organisations. Respondents from micro-finance 
Table 9 Responses to some of the collaborative insurance provision questions
Mainstream insurance company 
representatives
Micro-finance organisation 
representatives
Should private insurance companies offer micro-insurance on their own?
Yes 0% 33%
No 100% 50%
Unsure 0% 17%
Should microfinance institutions offer micro-insurance on their own?
Yes 33% 11%
No 67% 89%
Unsure 0% 0%
Would you deliver flood insurance in a partnership between private insurance companies and micro-finance organisations?
Yes 100% 33%
No 0% 67%
Unsure 0% 0%
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organisations were less positive about potential collaboration, highlighting that main-
stream insurers do not care about poor people and that they only seek to maximise 
profit (Table 9).
 The issue of collaboration was further addressed during the workshop at which the 
administrative heads of leading micro-credit organisations and private insurance 
companies were invited to participate. Both micro-credit providers and mainstream 
insurers were identified as having a stake in the outcomes and holding significant 
power in terms of the structure of a future market, albeit in a different manner. 
Mainstream insurers have financial power whereas the micro-credit providers have 
access to a large client base. Combining these two strengths may result in a win–win 
situation (Mechler et al., 2006; Hasan, 2007). However, disagreement over the type 
of stake in outcomes (either for financial gain or to achieve poverty-reduction objec-
tives) may imply that the two players are unwilling to cooperate. In that case, provision 
under the PA model may be impossible. For instance, the invitees at the workshop 
entered into a heated debate about their respective commitment to poverty eradica-
tion and social development in the country. Furthermore, significant disagreement 
emerged between the two parties over the type of stake in outcomes. Finally, it 
appeared that the two players were unwilling to cooperate with each other. One of the 
key informant interviewees summed up this problem as follows: ‘collaboration sounds 
like an interesting idea, however insurance companies are mostly profit-seeking, 
hence goals are different and the plan, therefore, would suffer under partnership’. 
Conclusions and policy implications
In the context of a growing body of economic literature on the appropriate institu-
tional framework for risk management and insurance provision, this study aimed to 
test the practicality of insuring poor livelihoods and property damage risks resulting 
from catastrophic events in developing countries. The results can be summarised as 
two key findings. First, the research reinforces the scepticism envisaged by Shiller 
(2003) about potential low effective demand for new insurance products. Only one-
half of the sample respondents agreed to participate in the hypothetical flood insur-
ance programme. Shiller (2003) rightly contends that most people do not appreciate 
the possibilities inherent in new technologies and, therefore, the process of initiation 
of such innovations is difficult. It appears from the study results that the introduc-
tion of a financial instrument like insurance could be even harder in a developing 
country where potential buyers are characterised by large-scale illiteracy and wide-
spread poverty.
 Second, the research identified some important supply-side obstacles associated with 
private provision of insurance overlooked by Shiller (2003) and many of his critics. 
The quantitative analysis demonstrates that a PA model as a specific organisational 
structure may help to reduce substantially the administration cost of insurance supply 
and thus some insurance contracts may turn out to be financially viable with respect 
to their cost-recovery levels. However, in the qualitative part of the analysis, the 
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study identified structural problems hindering potential collaboration under a PA 
model. The key players in the micro-insurance market in Bangladesh vary in terms 
of their motivations, degree of power and type of stakes they pursue in such a mar-
ket. These differences make collaboration under such an organisational framework 
less likely and a potential collaborative agreement unstable. This implies that the 
political economic context of the financial market in a country plays an important 
part in determining the prospects of risk-sharing instruments. 
 Both the quantitative empirical results and the main outcome of the in-depth inter-
views indicate that the outlook for a micro flood insurance market in Bangladesh 
is not very positive. One of the key challenges facing policymakers in this regard is, 
as expected, financial viability. Especially for the most preferred insurance product, 
crop insurance, a financially viable market can exist only under a PA organisational 
framework that minimises administration costs. Given the importance of profits 
among private insurance companies and the gap between the expected premium 
and the indemnity amount, it seems unlikely that private micro flood insurance can 
be introduced in Bangladesh at present. However, the empirical investigation only 
touched on the important issue of risk and transaction cost-sharing in determining 
the financial viability of a flood insurance market. Institutional and financial motiva-
tions and the driving forces of the two main players in the micro flood insurance 
market have to be reconciled for such a mode of provision to become a reality. 
 An important question remains as to whether such an insurance programme stands 
more chance of survival and whether it could become more viable if it was implemented 
through a public–private partnership. Brown and Churchill (2000) suggest that when 
determining the appropriate institutional–organisational model, one should not only 
look at the availability of partners, but also at available human resources and infor-
mation capabilities, motivations, and the goals underlying plans. In addition, it is 
important to consider in the organisational models access to clients, access to rein-
surance, and, last but not least, access to subsidies and donors. An examination of 
several annual reports of mainstream insurance companies and micro-credit pro-
viders that are currently offering some kind of micro-insurance products revealed 
that the latter receive a large amount in donations in the form of direct financial 
transfers. Such transfers affect the affordability of insurance schemes as they can be 
used to ‘top up’ premiums.
 Given that micro-credit providers expressed interest in offering an affordable 
insurance scheme and the large inflow of foreign donations in this sector, they may 
be able to play a key role in developing a micro flood insurance market. Micro-
credit providers, furthermore, have a competitive advantage in that they have more 
access to the client base, have better infrastructural facilities across even the most 
remote parts of Bangladesh, enjoy a greater degree of trust and credibility among 
clients, and have pre-existing information on client portfolios and risk history. This 
study also found indications that potential insurance clients prefer public provision 
of micro flood insurance, possibly because they consider flood risk protection a 
government responsibility or have a higher degree of trust in the public sector than 
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the private sector. However, one should not underestimate the importance of sound 
actuarial analysis in providing a viable insurance scheme in the long term. This exper-
tise is only available in private insurance companies. A government-directed and 
-facilitated process to settle and overcome the differences observed in this study 
between the non-profit micro-credit providers and profit-oriented private insur-
ance companies is needed, building on the particular competences that each party can 
lend to the development of a viable micro flood insurance market through a public–
private partnership.
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